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INTERVENTIONISM DEFENDED 
Kevin McCAIN 
ABSTRACT: James Woodward’s Making Things Happen presents the most fully 
developed version of a manipulability theory of causation. Although the ‘interventionist’ 
account of causation that Woodward defends in Making Things Happen has many 
admirable qualities, Michael Strevens argues that it has a fatal flaw. Strevens maintains 
that Woodward’s interventionist account of causation renders facts about causation 
relative to an individual’s perspective. In response to this charge, Woodward claims that 
although on his account X might be a relativized cause of Y relative to some perspective, 
this does not lead to the problematic relativity that Strevens claims. Roughly, Woodward 
argues this is so because if X is a relativized cause of Y with respect to some perspective, 
then X is a cause of Y simpliciter. So, the truth of whether X is a cause of Y is not 
relative to one’s perspective. Strevens counters by arguing that Woodward’s response 
fails because relativized causation is not monotonic. In this paper I argue that Strevens’ 
argument that relativized causation is not monotonic is unsound.  
KEYWORDS: causation, intervention, manipulation, James Woodward, Michael 
Strevens 
 
A commonsense way of thinking of causal relationships is that they are 
relationships that can allow one to bring about changes through various 
manipulations. In other words, if X causes Y, then manipulating X in appropriate 
ways should lead to changes in Y. This commonsense intuition lies at the heart of 
manipulability theories of causation.1 In order for a manipulability theory to have 
any hope of being an acceptable theory of causation it must provide an account 
what counts as the appropriate ways of manipulating X. A promising account of 
appropriate ways of manipulating X is James Woodward’s account, which defines 
the appropriate ways of manipulating as ‘interventions.’ According to Woodward, 
“an intervention I on X with respect to Y will be such that I causes a change in X, 
I does not cause a change in Y via some route that does not go through X, and I is 
exogenous in the sense of not itself having a cause that affects Y via a route that 
does not go through X.”2 Woodward’s interventionist account of causation 
                                                                
1 See, for example, R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1940), Georg von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1971), Peter Menzies and Huw Price, “Causation as a Secondary Quality,” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 44 (1993): 187-203, and James Woodward, Making Things Happen 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
2 James Woodward, “Cause and Explanation in Psychiatry: An Interventionist Perspective,” in 
Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology and Nosology, eds. K. Kendler 
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(hereafter referred to simply as ‘interventionism’) offers a powerful tool for 
understanding the nature of various causal relations that fits with the 
commonsense view of the connection between causation and manipulation.  
Although Woodward’s case in favor of interventionism is persuasive, 
interventionism is not without its detractors.3 Recently, Michael Strevens has 
attacked interventionism on the grounds that it introduces a problematic relativity 
to facts about causation.4 More precisely, Strevens argues that interventionism is 
committed to the claim that the facts concerning whether X is a contributing 
cause of Y are dependent upon one’s perspective because contributing causation is 
defined with respect to a variable set. In response to this charge, Woodward 
attempts to provide a de-relativized notion of contributing causation.5 
Woodward’s response involves distinguishing between being represented as a 
contributing cause (following Strevens this will be referred to as ‘relativized 
causation’) and being a contributing cause simpliciter.6 Woodward claims that 
although X is a relativized cause of Y relative to a particular variable set, it does 
not lead to the relativity that Strevens claims. Roughly, Woodward argues this is 
so because if X is a relativized cause of Y with respect to some variable set V, then 
X is a contributing cause of Y simpliciter. Woodward’s argument rests on the 
assumption that relativized causation is monotonic in the sense that adding 
variables to V will not lead to X’s no longer being a relativized cause of Y.7 
Strevens concedes that if successful, Woodward’s response would provide a de-
relativized notion of contributing causation.8 However, Strevens argues that 
Woodward’s response fails because relativized causation is not monotonic in this 
                                                                                                                                       
and J. Parnas (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 139. See Woodward, 
Making Things Happen, 98 for a more precise formal definition of ‘intervention.’ 
3 Since my purpose here is to defend interventionism from a particular objection rather than 
provide a full-scale argument for its acceptance, the interested reader is encouraged to consult 
Woodward, Making Things Happen, for a thorough presentation and defense of 
interventionism.  
4 Michael Strevens, “Essay Review of Woodward, Making Things Happen,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 233-49. 
5 James Woodward, “Response to Strevens,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 
(2008): 193-212. 
6 Michael Strevens, “Comments on Woodward, Making Things Happen,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 78 (2008): 171-92. 
7 When Woodward and Strevens speak of adding variables to a variable set, they do not mean 
that the phenomenon ‘in the world’ that is being represented is changed in any way. Adding 
variables to a variable set amounts to giving a more detailed account of the phenomenon in 
question. 
8 Strevens, “Comments on Woodward.” 
Interventionism Defended 
63 
way. Given the assumed failure of Woodward’s response, Strevens concludes that 
interventionism has the unacceptable consequence of entailing that causation is 
relative to one’s perspective. 
My goal in this paper is to defend interventionism by demonstrating that 
Strevens’ argument is unsound. In section one, I lay out the relevant aspects of 
interventionism as defined by Woodward in Making Things Happen (MTH). 
Additionally, I describe how Woodward modifies the notion of contributing cause 
in response to Strevens’ initial objection. Also, I explain how this modification to 
the notion of contributing causation is supposed to meet Strevens’ challenge of 
providing a de-relativized notion of contributing causation. In section two, I 
explicate Strevens’ argument against the monotonicity of relativized causation. I 
also describe both the example that Strevens uses to support a key premise in his 
argument and the example that he uses to motivate his overall argument. In the 
third and final section, I argue for the falsity of a key premise in Strevens’ 
argument. In addition, I argue that the example that Strevens presents to support 
this premise is problematic. What is more, in this section I also explicate why the 
example that Strevens uses to motivate his overall argument is flawed.    
1. Interventionism and De-Relativized Contributing Causation 
In order to appreciate Woodward’s attempt to provide a de-relativized notion of 
contributing causation as well as the moves made in the dialectical exchange 
between Woodward and Strevens, it is necessary to be clear about the precise 
definitions of the following notions: intervention, direct cause, and contributing 
cause. To begin, the general idea of an intervention is fairly straightforward. 
Interventions are manipulations upon one or more variables in a system under 
idealized experimental conditions. An intervention on a variable X should be 
understood in terms of experimental manipulations of X that are well designed for 
determining if X causes Y in an idealized experimental setting (an experimental 
setting that excludes confounding influences). More precisely, “I’s assuming some 
value I=zi, is an intervention on X with respect to Y if and only if I is an 
intervention variable for X with respect to Y and I= zi is an actual cause of the 
value taken by X.”9 Woodward explains that I is an intervention variable on X 
with respect to Y just in case: 
(IV) I1. I causes X 
I2. I acts as a switch for all the other variables that cause X. That is, 
certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to 
                                                                
9 Woodward, Making Things Happen, 98. 
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depend on the values of other variables that cause X and instead 
depends only on the value taken by I. 
I3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not 
directly cause Y and is not the cause of any causes of Y that are distinct 
from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into 
the I-X-Y connection itself: that is, except for (a) any causes of Y that 
are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and Y) and 
(b) any causes of Y that are between I and X and have no effect on Y 
independently of X. 
I4. I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and 
that is on a directed path that does not go through X.10 
Simply put, the idea is that an intervention on X is some sort of change that an 
experimenter in an ideal setting can bring about in X that is such that the method 
of bringing about that change will directly affect only X and the method of 
changing X will exclusively set the value of X. 
The next notion that needs to be defined is direct cause. According to 
Woodward, X is a direct cause of Y with respect to variable set V if and only if 
there is “a possible intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability 
distribution of Y) when all other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at 
some value by interventions.”11  
Now the notion that lies at the heart of the debate between Woodward and 
Strevens, contributing cause, needs to be examined. Woodward defines a 
contributing cause in the following manner: 
A necessary and sufficient condition for X to be a (type-level) contributing cause 
of Y with respect to variable set V is that (i) there be a directed path from X to Y 
such that each link in this path is a direct causal relationship; that is, a set of 
variables Z1…Zn such that X is a direct cause of Z1, which is in turn a direct cause 
of Z2, which is a direct cause of …Zn, which is a direct cause of Y, and that (ii) 
there be some intervention on X that will change Y when all other variables in V 
that are not on this path are fixed at some value. If there is only one path P from 
X to Y or if the only alternative path from X to Y besides P contains no 
intermediate variables (i.e., is direct), then X is a contributing cause of Y as long 
as there is some intervention on X that will change the value of Y, for some 
values of the other variables in V.12 
                                                                
10 Woodward, Making Things Happen, 98. Woodward notes that any unqualified instance of 
‘cause’ in this definition should be understood to mean contributing cause.  
11 Woodward, Making Things Happen, 55. 
12 Woodward, Making Things Happen, 59. 
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Strevens argues that interventionism makes causation relative to one’s 
perspective because according to Woodward’s definition, whether or not X is a 
contributing cause of Y is a relative matter.13 He supports this claim by pointing 
out that contributing cause is defined with respect to a variable set. So, Strevens 
challenges Woodward to explain how interventionism can provide an account of 
contributing causation that is not dependent upon one’s perspective. That is, 
Strevens challenges Woodward to de-relativize the notion of contributing cause. 
In light of this criticism and the challenge put forward by Strevens, 
Woodward makes the following modifications. First, he claims that the above 
definition of contributing cause from MTH would have been better put as 
necessary and sufficient conditions for “X to be correctly represented as a 
contributing cause of Y with respect to V.”14 Second, he claims that “One can then 
go on to say that X is a contributing cause of Y simpliciter (in a sense that isn’t 
relativized to any particular variable set V) as long as it is true that there exists a 
variable set V such that X is correctly represented as a contributing cause of Y 
with respect to V.”15 
Given Woodward’s modifications it is easy to see how he responds to 
Strevens’ challenge. First, the original notion of contributing cause is not to be 
understood as a definition of contributing causation, but instead as a definition of 
representation as a contributing cause (relativized causation). Second, Woodward 
offers a de-relativization of contributing causation by claiming that X is a 
contributing cause of Y (in a non-relativized sense) if and only if X is a relativized 
cause of Y relative to some variable set. As Strevens notes, Woodward’s de-
relativization of contributing causation is a success only if relativized causation is 
monotonic.16 That is, Woodward has defended interventionism from the charge of 
relativity only if it is true that “if X is a relative cause of Y with respect to a 
variable set V, then it is also a relative cause of Y with respect to any superset of 
V.”17  
Now that the relevant items of interventionism have been defined and 
Woodward’s response to Strevens’ challenge explained, I will explicate Strevens’ 
argument against the monotonicity of relativized causation.     
 
 
                                                                
13 Strevens, “Essay Review of Woodward.” 
14 Woodward, “Response to Strevens,” 209. 
15 Woodward, “Response to Strevens,” 209. 
16 Strevens, “Comments on Woodward.” 
17 Strevens, “Comments on Woodward,” 175. 
Kevin McCain 
66 
2. Strevens’ Attack on Monotonicity  
Strevens argues that Woodward’s attempt to provide an unrelativized notion of 
contributing causation fails because relativized causation is not monotonic. More 
specifically, Strevens argues that X may be a relativized cause of Y relative to 
variable set V, but not a relativized cause of Y relative to variable set V* (a variable 
set constructed by adding more variables to V). Strevens offers the following 
formulation of his argument: 
1. Adding variables to a variable set can sometimes make relativized causal 
relations appear (as monotonicity allows). 
2. A variable’s counting as an intervener depends on the non-existence of certain 
relations of relativized causation. 
3. Thus (from (1) and (2)), variables may lose their status as interveners as other 
variables are added to the variable set. 
4. A variable’s status as a relativized cause requires the existence of an intervener 
with respect to which a certain further condition is satisfied. If a variable loses 
its status as an intervener, then, other variables may lose their status as 
relativized causes.   
5. Thus (from (3) and (4)), variables may lose their status as relativized causes as 
other variables are added to the variable set.18 
Concerning line one, Strevens correctly notes that it is consistent with 
monotonicity. One can easily see how this premise is true given interventionism. 
To illustrate this, consider a variable set, V, which includes only X and Y where X 
is a relative cause of Y. Suppose further that as a matter of fact there are 
intermediate causal links between X and Y (this is an unproblematic supposition 
because it is plausible that there are intermediate links between any causally 
related variables – excepting, perhaps, those that are representative of features of 
fundamental physical reality). If the variable set V were supplemented with one of 
these intermediate causal links, Z, relativized causal relations will appear in the 
augmented variable set V*. Specifically, relativized causal relations between Z and 
both X and Y that did not hold relative to V will hold relative to V*.19, 20   
                                                                
18 Strevens, “Comments on Woodward,” 175-76. 
19 Strevens also appeals to an example to help support this premise. However, it is not necessary 
to describe this example in detail because the example is problematic and, further, it is not 
needed to support this premise.  
20 Michael Strevens has mentioned (personal correspondence) that this is not quite how he 
intended to support this premise. Strevens thinks that this premise is true because he thinks that 
adding variables to a variable set, V, can lead to the appearance of relativized causal relations 
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Line two of this argument is true largely by definition. According to 
Woodward, I’s being an intervention on X with respect to Y requires that I not be 
a contributing cause of Y via some causal path that does not go through X. 
Strevens points out that the notion of an intervention does not explicitly appeal to 
relativization to a variable set, but it does appeal to the notion of contributing 
causation. He correctly notes that the notion of contributing cause that is appealed 
to in the definition of an intervention is either relativized or not. If it is 
relativized, then this premise is true. If it is not relativized, then it not clear that 
Woodward’s attempt to provide an unrelativized notion of contributing causation 
is successful. As Strevens says “it is far from clear that an account of unrelativized 
causation that takes the form of a definition invoking unrelativized causal facts 
constitutes a genuine derelativization.”21 While it is not certain that an 
unrelativized notion of causation cannot be crafted in this way, Strevens is correct 
in claiming that it is not clear that it can. So, the truth of this premise should be 
granted. 
Strevens supports his premise in line four by way of an example. In 
Strevens’ example an experimenter is interested in determining whether bottled 
water consumption is a cause of heart disease. According to Strevens, a bungling 
experimenter may manipulate subjects’ bottled water consumption by increasing 
their intake of salty foods. Since eating salty foods increases one’s chance of heart 
disease, there will be a correlation between increased bottled water consumption 
and heart disease in this case. Strevens claims that relative to the variable set that 
only includes bottled water and heart disease; salty food intake will count as an 
intervention on bottled water consumption with respect to heart disease. So, 
relative to this variable set bottled water consumption will count as a cause of 
heart disease. However, Strevens maintains that if we augment this variable set 
with other variables, such as artery hardening, a relativized causal relation 
between salty food intake and heart disease will appear; thus, revoking the status 
of salty food intake as an intervention on bottled water consumption. As a result 
of the failure of salty food intake to count as an intervention relative to this 
variable set, bottled water consumption will lose its status as a relativized cause of 
heart disease. 
                                                                                                                                       
between the members of the original set V. For example, Strevens thinks that even though X 
and Y are causally unrelated relative to V, adding variables to V can make a relativized causal 
relation between X and Y appear. I think that Strevens is mistaken on this point, however, since 
Strevens and I both agree that this premise is true, the issue of what makes this premise is true 
can be set aside for the moment.  
21 Strevens, “Comments on Woodward,” 181. 
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Although Strevens uses similar examples to support the premises in lines 
one and four of his argument, he notes that these two examples each involve a 
different set of assumptions. So, in an effort to bolster his overall argument 
Strevens presents a third example, which purports to describe a situation in which 
both premise one and premise four are true. Here is Strevens’ third example. 
Again he is considering the relationship between drinking bottled water (B) and 
heart disease (H). In this example Strevens stipulates that eating salty foods (S) 
sometimes leads one to drink bottled water and sometimes leads one to drink red 
wine (W). He assumes that if eating salty foods leads one in a particular instance 
to drink bottled water, then it does not lead to her drinking red wine; and vice 
versa. He also stipulates that this sporadic consumption of red wine is enough to 
off-set the effect that eating salty foods has on heart disease by hardening one’s 
arteries (A). Strevens points out that eating salty foods may be used to manipulate 
bottled water consumption, but it will only be successful some of the time because 
eating salty foods sometimes leads to red wine consumption. However, Strevens 
claims that in the subset of cases where eating salty foods successfully manipulates 
bottled water consumption there will be a correlation between bottled water 
consumption and heart disease because there will be no red wine consumption to 
off-set the effect eating salty foods has on heart disease. He goes on to say that the 
fact that S is not a legitimate intervention on B with respect to H will only show 
up when the variable set under consideration includes either W or A. So, Strevens 
maintains that B will be a relativized cause of H relative to the variable set {B, H, 
S}. However, since S will not be an intervention on B with respect to H relative to 
variable sets {B, H, S, W}, {B, H, S, A}, or {B, H, S, W, A}, B will not be a 
relativized cause of H relative to any of these variable sets. Strevens argues that his 
example illustrates a situation where B is a relativized cause of H relative to a 
particular variable set, but B fails to be a relativized cause of H relative to variable 
sets constructed by adding further variables to the original variable set. Thus, 
Strevens concludes that this example reveals that relativized causation is not 
monotonic.   
3. In Defense of Monotonicity  
My strategy for defending Woodward’s claim that relativized causation is 
monotonic from Strevens’ attack is straightforward. I argue that the premise in 
line four of Strevens’ argument, “If a variable loses its status as an intervener, then, 
other variables may lose their status as relativized causes,” is false. First, I argue 
that the example that Strevens appeals to in defending this premise fails to provide 
evidence for its truth. Second, I explicate why Strevens’ third example, which is 
Interventionism Defended 
69 
designed to motivate his overall argument, is problematic. Third, I explain why in 
general arguments of the kind Strevens offers fail to establish that relativized 
causation is not monotonic.  
In order to demonstrate that the premise “If a variable loses its status as an 
intervener, then, other variables may lose their status as relativized causes” is false, 
it is important to first spend a little time re-examining the notion of an 
intervention. Specifically, it is necessary to examine the conditions under which a 
variable I counts as an intervention on X with respect to Y. For the sake of 
simplicity, in the course of evaluating these conditions I will consider a very 
sparse variable set, V, which includes only I, X, and Y. According to Woodward’s 
definition I is an intervention on X with respect to Y just in case I is an actual 
cause of the value taken by X and I is an intervention variable for X. In order to be 
an intervention variable for X, I must satisfy four further conditions of IV: 1) I has 
to cause X, 2) I has to act as a switch for all other variables that cause X, 3) I must 
not be a direct cause of Y nor a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct from the 
causal connection I-X-Y, and 4) I must be statistically independent of any 
variables that cause Y without causing X. Utilizing the sparse variable set 
mentioned above {I, X, Y}, let us assume that I is an intervention on X with respect 
to Y. So, I’s having the value that it does causes X to have its actual value and I is 
solely responsible for X having that value (this follows from the first condition of 
an intervention and the first two conditions of IV). Additionally, there is no 
possible intervention on I that will change the value of Y when X is held fixed at a 
certain value via other interventions (this follows from condition three of IV and 
the definition of direct cause). Finally, there are no causes of Y that are also causes 
of I (this follows from condition four of IV). 
At this point I will turn to a critical assessment of the example Strevens uses 
to support the premise “If a variable loses its status as an intervener, then, other 
variables may lose their status as relativized causes.”  Recall that Strevens’ example 
involves the incompetent experimenter who uses salty food intake (S) to 
manipulate bottled water consumption (B) in order to determine if bottle water 
consumption (B) causes heart disease (H). Strevens maintains that if we simply 
consider the variable set {S, B, H}, S will be an intervention on B with respect to 
H. So, B will be a relativized cause of H relative to this variable set because using S 
to intervene on B will lead to a change in H. However, he claims that if further 
variables such as artery hardening (A) were added to this variable set, S would lose 
its status as an intervention. Thus, B would not be a relativized cause of H relative 
to the augmented set {S, B, H, A}.  
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This example is ineffectual because, contrary to what Strevens claims, S is 
not an intervention on B with respect to H even in the impoverished three 
variable set. The reason that this is the case is obvious. S fails to meet the third 
condition of IV. That is, relative to the variable set containing {S, B, H} S will be a 
direct cause of H. S is a direct cause of H relative to this variable set because there 
are possible interventions on S that lead to changes in H while B is held fixed. 
Keeping with Strevens’ example, one such intervention would be for the 
experimenter to lock the subjects in a room with only salty food to eat while 
providing the subjects a fixed quantity of bottled water to drink and nothing else. 
If the experimenter intervenes on salty food intake while holding bottled water 
consumption fixed in this manner, there will be a correlation between salty food 
and heart disease. 
One might worry that this way of responding to Strevens’ example sneaks 
in an unrelativized notion of causation into the notion of an intervention. The 
concern here is that whether S is a direct cause of H relative to this variable set 
depends on relations between S, B, H, and variables outside of the variable set 
under consideration. One might think that what is really occurring here is an 
illegitimate appeal to facts about all of the variables there are for determining 
what counts as an intervention. So, the worry is that appealing to these facts about 
variables outside of the variable set under consideration is utilizing unrelativized 
causation.22   
There are two ways of responding to this worry. The first way to respond is 
to point out that there is nothing in this response to Strevens’ example that appeals 
to an unrelativized notion of causation. Direct causation is a relativized notion of 
causation. Further, appealing to the existence of variables that can possibly be 
added to a variable set is not invoking unrelativized causation. The second way to 
respond is to draw attention to the fact that the satisfaction of the third condition 
of IV only requires that it not be possible to manipulate S in a way that will affect 
H while B is held fixed. Again nothing about this suggests an illicit appeal to 
unrelativized notions of causation. 
                                                                
22 This objection bears some similarity to an unrelated objection that Strevens, “Essay Review of 
Woodward,” raises for Woodward’s account of causation. Strevens argues that in order to 
determine whether I is an intervention we need to know about the causal relations that I bears 
to other variables. In order to determine these relations we need to intervene on I, so we need 
another intervention variable I* that is an intervention on I. However, in order to determine 
whether I* is an intervention we need to know about the causal relations that I* bears to other 
variables, and so on. Thus, there seems to be a problem with ever determining whether I is an 
intervention.  
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Given my treatment of the example Strevens uses to support this premise, 
the problem with the example he uses to motivate his overall argument is 
probably apparent. However, at the risk of a bit redundancy I will briefly explain 
what is wrong with this example as well. Remember that in this example Strevens 
stipulates that eating salty foods (S) sometimes leads one to drink bottled water (B) 
and sometimes leads one to drink red wine (W). He assumes that if eating salty 
foods leads one in a particular instance to drink bottled water, then it does not 
lead to her drinking red wine; and vice versa. Further this occasional consumption 
of red wine is enough to off-set the effect that eating salty foods has on heart 
disease (H) by hardening one’s arteries (A). Strevens claims that in the subset of 
cases where eating salty foods successfully manipulates bottled water consumption 
there will be a correlation between bottled water consumption and heart disease 
because there will be no red wine consumption to off-set the effect eating salty 
foods has on heart disease. He believes that the fact that S is not a legitimate 
intervention on B with respect to H will only show up when the variable set 
under consideration includes either W or A. So, Strevens maintains that B will be 
a relativized cause of H relative to the variable set {B, H, S}. However, since S will 
not be an intervention on B with respect to H relative to variable sets {B, H, S, W}, 
{B, H, S, A}, or {B, H, S, W, A}, B will not be a relativized cause of H relative to 
any of these variable sets.  
This example shares the same problem as the previous example. Namely, S 
does not meet the conditions for being an intervention on B with respect to H. 
Again in this example S is a direct cause of H relative to this variable set because 
there are possible interventions on S that lead to changes in H while B is held 
fixed. One such intervention would be the one I described above, giving someone 
only salty food to eat and a limited supply of bottled water to drink and nothing 
else. In this situation changes in S would be correlated with changes in H while B 
is held fixed. Since S is not an intervention on B with respect to H, B will not be a 
relativized cause of H relative to the variable set {S, B, H}. So, Strevens’ example 
fails to illustrate a situation where a variable that is a relativized cause relative to a 
variable set ceases to be so when more variables are added to the variable set. 
One might try to defend Strevens’ example from my objection by having S 
represent not only the eating of salty food, but instead the eating of salty food in 
an environment where bottled water and red wine are both freely available. If S 
represents the eating of salty foods in an environment where bottled water and 
red wine are both freely available, one may think that the experiment that I 
describe above will not count as an intervention on S. The idea is that given what 
S represents in this case, an experiment that only gives someone salty food to eat 
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and bottled water to drink will not be intervening on S because the experiment 
requires an environment that differs from the one specified by S. So, the 
experiment that I describe would fail to be an intervention on S with respect to H. 
Since the experiment does not intervene on S, it cannot show that S is a direct 
cause of H. Thus, the experiment described above cannot demonstrate that S is not 
an intervention on B with respect to H, and so, it fails to pose a problem for 
Strevens’ example.23 
Although it is true that understanding S as representing eating salty foods in 
the specified environment will make it the case that the experiment I describe is 
not an intervention on S with respect to H, this move will not save Strevens’ 
example. The problem for Strevens’ example does not go away by having S specify 
a particular environment. Even if S represents eating salty foods in an 
environment where bottled water and red wine are both freely available, there are 
possible interventions on S that lead to changes in H while B is held fixed. One 
such intervention would be to perform an experiment where subjects are given 
only salty food to eat and they are forced to drink so much bottled water that 
although there is red wine available, they will not drink any. This experiment will 
count as an intervention on S and it has the same result as the original experiment 
that I described, namely, it results in subjects who eat salty foods and only drink 
bottled water. So, this experiment will expose the causal connection between S 
and H because changes in the amount of salty food eaten in this circumstance will 
lead to changes in heart disease, and hence, this experiment demonstrates that S is 
not an intervention on B with respect to H. Thus, even if S represents eating salty 
foods in a specified environment, Strevens’ example is still problematic.      
Now that I have shown why Strevens’ argument is unsuccessful I will 
explain why other arguments of this kind will also fail to demonstrate that 
relativized causation is not monotonic. As noted above, there are very specific 
conditions under which I may be properly said to be an intervention on X with 
respect to Y. Given an understanding of these conditions, it is possible to see how 
adding variables to variable set V, which includes {I, X, Y}, might result in I’s no 
longer meeting those conditions. Since I is the sole cause of X having the value 
that it does and I, X, Y are the only variables in the set, I will be a direct cause of X 
relative to this set. Adding variables to V can make it the case that I is no longer a 
direct cause of X. For instance, there may be a variable Z that is a causal link 
between I and X. However, this fact will not mean that I is no longer an 
intervention because adding variables will not make it the case that I fails to be a 
cause of X. So, adding variables will not lead to I’s failing to satisfy the first 
                                                                
23 Thanks to Michael Strevens for drawing my attention to this objection. 
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condition for being an intervention nor the first condition for being an 
intervention variable. The second condition of IV requires I to essentially sever 
the causal links between X and all other variables besides Y. It seems possible that 
if enough variables are added to V, there will be some for which I fails to function 
as a switch. So, it seems possible that adding variables to V may lead to I failing to 
meet the second condition of intervention variables. Since I is not a direct cause of 
Y relative to V, then adding variables to the set will not lead to I becoming one. 
Likewise, adding variables to the set will not lead to I becoming a cause of Y along 
another path than the I-X-Y path. So, adding variables will not lead to I’s failing to 
satisfy condition three of IV. Finally, if I is statistically independent of any cause 
of Y (as condition four requires), then adding further variables to V will not lead 
to I and Y having a common cause. So, it seems that the only way that adding 
variables to a variable set can remove I’s status as an intervention is by introducing 
variables that are causally related to X that are such that I cannot block their 
causal impact on X.  
In order for arguments like Strevens’ to be successful it has to be the case 
that there are ways that a variable can lose its status as an intervener which result 
in other variables losing their status as relative causes. However, the only way that 
I can lose its status as an intervener by adding variables to V is for it to fail to 
disrupt the causal connections between some of these new variables and X. This 
situation will not result in variables losing their status as relativized causes in 
general and it will not result in X losing its status as a relativized cause of Y in 
particular. So, an evaluation of the conditions for I being an intervener shows that 
Strevens’ argument and other arguments of the same kind cannot demonstrate 
that relativized causation is not monotonic.      
Assuming that what I have said here is correct, Strevens fails to show that 
relativized causation is not monotonic. More generally, arguments of the kind that 
Strevens presents cannot establish that relativized causation is not monotonic. 
Thus, it reasonable to conclude that Woodward’s attempt to provide an 
unrelativized notion of contributing causation is successful. Which in turn means 
that it is reasonable to think that interventionism does not render causation 
relative in the problematic way that Strevens suggests.24   
 
                                                                
24 Thanks to Michael Strevens and Jim Woodward for helpful discussion of this topic. A very 
special thanks to Brad Weslake for comments on numerous earlier drafts and for many fruitful 
discussions of these issues.  
